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SINCE CHILDREN ARE NOT LITTLE 
ADULTS—SOCIALLY—WHAT’S AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIST TO DO? 
SANDRA HOFFMANN† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1665, Diego Velázquez painted what was to become one of the 
great works of western art, Las Meninas. The large canvas portrays 
Velasquez painting the Infanta Margarita, daughter of King Phillip IV 
and Queen Mariana of Spain, along with members of the court. The 
work was completed at the height of belief in preformationism.  
Preformationism was an early theory of development that saw 
children as arriving into the world as miniature adults, physically and 
socially.1 In the painting, Infanta Margarita, who can be no more than 
five or six, appears all the miniature queen. Starting with Locke and 
Rouseau, preformationist conceptions of children’s social, cognitive, 
and moral development gradually gave way to a more complex 
understanding of childhood as a sequence of developmental changes.2 
Preformationism was also a theory of biological development.3 
Well into the 1990s, we could have said that U.S. environmental 
policy took a preformationist view of children—to the extent that 
children were considered at all. In fact, the rallying cry of the efforts 
to bring children’s health concerns into federal environmental policy 
was “children are not just little adults.” The driving concern behind 
this cry was that environmental standards were set based on the 
impact of environmental hazards on adult health. And yet, 
physiologically, children are not little adults. As children pass through 
complex developmental phases, they are affected by environmental 
 
 † Fellow, Resources for the Future. 
 1. WILLIAM CRAIN, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 1 (5th 
ed. 2004); PHILLIPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 
33-34 (1962). 
 2. CRAIN, supra note 1 at 4-19. 
 3. Jane Maienschein, Epigenesis and Preformationism (Oct. 11, 2005), in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY  (2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epigenesis/. 
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conditions quite differently than adults. Often, as with the case of 
neurotoxin exposure during critical periods of brain development, 
these differences can be severe and permanent. Several statutes and 
rules now recognize this explicitly.4 For the past decade or more, 
regulatory science has been working out the implications of taking 
children’s physiological differences from adults seriously.5 
Environmental economics has been going down the same path, 
but more slowly.6  Under the 1997 Executive Order 13045, titled 
“Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety 
Risks”, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required 
to conduct economic analysis of economically significant 
environmental regulations that the agency believes may 
disproportionately affect children.7 But to a large extent, it is fair to 
say that environmental economics is still preformationist in what it 
can contribute to regulatory analysis. 
In this article I explore what it might mean for environmental 
economics to take the implications of a modern understanding of 
children’s cognitive, social, and moral development seriously. 
Environmental economists recognize that taking children seriously 
 
 4. See U.S. Environmental Health Protection Agency (EPA), Children’s Health 
Protection: Regulations, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/regs.htm# (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2007) (listing rulemaking activities designed to protect children). 
 5. See EPA, Children’s Health Protection, Scientific Data and Methods, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/Whatwe_scientif.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2007) (discussing ongoing efforts at improving the scientific basis for developing standards 
designed to protect children’s health). 
 6. For a view of EPA funded economic research on valuation of children’s health benefits 
from environmental programs, see EPA, National Center for Environmental Research, Science 
Topics: Economics and Decision Sciences, http://es.epa.gov/ncer/science/economics/ (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2007).  For a list of recent EPA-funded workshops on children’s health, see EPA, 
National Center for Environmental Economics, Past Workshops: Valuing Health for 
Environmental Policy with Special Emphasis on Children’s Health Issues, March 24 and March 
25, 1999; Valuing Environmental Health Risk Reductions to Children, October 20 and 21, 2003; 
Morbidity and Mortality: How Do We Value the Risk of Death and Illness? April 10-12, 2006 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/wkshp.nsf/Past+Workshops (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). 
 7. Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (April 23, 1997),  amended by Exec. Order 
13,229, 66 Fed. Reg. 52,013 (Oct. 11, 2001) and Exec. Order 13,296, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,931 (April 
23, 2003).  See also EPA OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND INNOVATION (OPEI), EPA’S 
ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS GUIDE TO CONSIDERING CHILDREN’S HEALTH WHEN 
DEVELOPING EPA ACTIONS: IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13045 AND EPA’S POLICY 
ON EVALUATING HEALTH RISKS TO CHILDREN 7 (Oct. 2006) available at  
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/ADPguide.htm/$File/EPA_ADP_Guide_508
.pdf. 
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poses significant challenges to standard economic practice.8  In 
particular it challenges conventional notions of consumer sovereignty 
that underlie much of economic analysis.  Economists’ commitment 
to consumer sovereignty reflects a belief that each individual is the 
best judge of his or her own preferences and well-being.  One of the 
major themes of the discussion that follows is that focusing on 
children challenges this assumption and is forcing economists to think 
about who can best represent the changes in children’s welfare 
created by environmental programs.  I will try to show that as 
economists consider the implications of child development more 
seriously, they can learn a great deal from law, as well as from their 
sister social sciences. 
EPA has been investing in economic research focused on 
children’s health valuation and has developed preliminary guidance 
on valuing benefits of reducing risks to children’s health.9  The agency 
is explicit in noting that this is only interim guidance because so little 
research has yet been completed on valuation of environmental 
programs that protect children’s health. But the guidance is also clear 
in that the agency does not expect the value placed on protecting 
children’s health will necessarily be the same as the value placed on 
protecting adult health.10  The final word is far from in on what 
economic research has to say about valuing protection of children’s 
health. But looking at economic theory and examining early empirical 
results suggests that people may well put a premium on protecting the 
young, though that premium appears to decrease as children 
gradually develop into young adults. In other words, it appears that 
children are not emerging as little adults from an economic 
perspective either. 
I also want to suggest that economics has much to contribute in 
gaining a clearer picture of how environmental hazards and policies 
affect children’s health. In the risk paradigm that underlies regulatory 
analysis in U.S. environmental policy, economics is often seen as 
fulfilling an accounting function on the risk management side of the 
 
 8. See EPA, CHILDREN’S HEALTH VALUATION HANDBOOK at 2-1 (Oct. 2003), available 
at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/pages/HandbookChildrensHealthValuation.html 
(scroll to bottom of page and follow the pdf hyperlink to the Handbook). 
 9. Supra notes 6 and 8. 
 10. For a related discussion, see Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 
DUKE L.J. 385, 386 (2004); Anna Alberini, Maureen Cropper, Alan Krupnick and Nathalie 
Simon, Does the Value of Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status?  Evidence from the 
U.S. and Canada, J. OF ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. (forthcoming).  See also Katharine Q. Seelye 
& John Tierney, EPA Drops Age-Based Cost Studies N.Y.TIMES, May 8, 2003 at A35. 
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divide between risk assessment and management.11 Much of the 
controversy in the legal literature about the role of economics in 
environmental policy has focused on this accounting function.12  But 
economics as a discipline is primarily interested in behavior—
especially in how behavior is influenced by financial, technological, 
time, and knowledge constraints. As a result, there is the potential 
that economics can make contributions wherever human behavior is 
relevant to policy analysis.  While I will focus primarily on issues that 
arise in valuation, I also want to examine ’the contributions 
economics can make to assessing risk and designing and evaluating 
policy. 
In Part II of the following discussion, I look at ways in which a 
broader integration of economic analysis into regulatory risk analysis 
could help improve exposure assessment as well as policy design and 
evaluation.  I describe new data collection efforts that could help this 
effort.  Part III turns to a discussion of health valuation.  EPA has 
recommended using parents’ willingness to pay (WTP) as a measure 
of the benefits of environmental policies that reduce risks to 
children’s health.  I show that a measure more consistent with 
economic theory would include a broader range of beneficiaries, but 
that concerns about double counting individuals’ benefits raise 
questions about the inclusion of benefits to those other than children.  
Part IV looks at the problem that children’s immaturity poses for 
economists’ reliance on the principal of consumer sovereignty.  I 
argue that the law of informed consent and minors and recent 
research on child development and judgment about risk support 
EPA’s interim recommendation that parents’ preferences stand in for 
children’s, but also suggests ways in which children’s own voices 
might enter into valuation of the benefits of environmental programs 
protecting children’s health.  Part V briefly reviews the emerging 
economics literature estimating adults’ WTP to protect children’s 
health from environmental hazards.  One consistent result emerges – 
parents appear willing to pay significantly more to protect their 
children’s health as they are their own.  Finally Part VI pulls together 
lessons from this analysis of both law and theoretical and empirical 
economic research for the role of economic analysis in evaluating 
children’s environmental health policy. 
 
 11. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
MANAGING THE PROCESS, (1983). 
 12. See, e.g., infra note 28. 
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II.  THE OTHER SIDE OF ENVIRONMENTAL  
ECONOMICS: RISK ASSESSMENT AND BEYOND 
Federal regulatory agencies are required to conduct risk 
assessments to evaluate the consequences of exposure to a hazard and 
to assess the benefits from environmental regulation.13  Risk 
assessment is typically viewed as the domain of science, in particular, 
physical and biological sciences.  Despite the fact that environmental 
health risks are frequently a function of human choice and behavior, 
potential contributions of economics and other social sciences are 
often overlooked.  Consequently, the “feedback loop” between 
human behavior and environmental health risk is often ignored in 
regulatory risk analysis.  Senior analysts from agencies with as diverse 
a set of responsibilities as the Food and Drug Administration and 
U.S. E.P.A. see this as a problem.14 
Regulatory risk assessments model health outcomes relying on 
baseline conditions and alternative intervening decisions, which 
generally are taken as unchanging givens.15  In the real world, 
however, individuals and firms respond to changes in information, 
prices and other market conditions and these responses can, in turn 
affect baseline conditions and the actual effects of environmental 
policy.  Behavioral responses can be directly related to environmental 
hazards, as when parents make sure that their children use inhalers 
properly to reduce the severity of asthma episodes. 
But behavior can also be influenced by factors unrelated to the 
environmental hazard, as when escalating housing prices push young 
families to live in areas with poorer air quality or older, ill-maintained 
housing stock.  There is a large body of economics literature that uses 
the actions that people take to avert exposure or reduce its’ health 
 
 13. See generally, U.S. Office of Mangement and Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment 
Bulletin, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf.  
Risk assessment focuses on hazard identification, dose-response estimation, exposure 
assessment, and risk characterization.  See supra note 11 at 19-20. 
 14. See Richard Williams & Kimberly Thompson, Combining Risk and Economic 
Assessments While Preserving the Separation of Powers, RISK ANALYSIS (Dec. 2004); C.A 
Mansfield & C. Poulos, Household Production Function (Sept. 2005) (memorandum prepared 
for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through E.H. Pechan & Associates, with Bryan 
Hubbell of U.S. E.P.A.); Chris Dockins, Charles Griffiths, Nicole Owens, Nathalie Simon, & 
Daniel Axelrad, Linking Economics and Risk Assessment,  67  J. OF TOXICOLOGY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, 611, 611-620;  Personal communications with Bryan Hubbell of 
U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park (March 23, 
2007) and Chris Dockins, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. E.P.A., 
Washington, D.C. (March 7, 2007). 
 15. Williams & Thompson supra note 14 at 1615-17. 
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impact as a means of measuring how much people value reductions in 
environmental health risks.16  This knowledge could be applied in 
bringing behavioral “feedback loops” into risk assessment. 
Risk assessments often model health end points in ways that may 
be amenable to laboratory analysis, but are difficult to translate into 
health outcomes that are meaningful to ordinary people and 
therefore could influence behavior. 17  For example, risk assessments 
on lead paint hazards model health outcomes as changes in children’s 
blood lead levels or IQ.  In focus groups for a health valuation study, 
my colleagues and I found that parents had a difficult time relating 
these physical outcome measures to something meaningful in their 
children’s lives.  These parents wanted to know how blood lead levels 
and changes in IQ would affect their children’s ability to function in 
school as children or in the work place as adults. 
An example from pesticide regulation can help illustrate what is 
at stake.  EPA already relies on economic estimates of food 
consumption in assessing exposure to pesticide residues in food, but 
consumption is usually seen as static, technical parameters that do not 
change.  In contrast, economists generally see consumption as 
behavior that responds to factors unrelated to environmental policy 
that can and do change over time. In fact, food consumption in the 
United States has been changing fairly radically in recent years. For 
example, studies on obesity show that changes in women’s labor 
market participation are resulting in noticeable changes in children’s 
diets.18 As time constraints are tightening for their mothers, American 
 
 16. See e.g., Carol Mansfield, F. Reed Johnson & George Van Houtven, The Missing Piece: 
Valuing Averting Behavior for Children’s Ozone Exposures, 28 RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECON. 
215 (2006); David Archer, Thomas Crocker & Jason Shogren, Choosing Children’s 
Environmental Risk, 33 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 347 (2006); Mark Dickie, Parental 
Behavior and the Value of Children’s Health: A Health Production Approach, 71 SOUTHERN 
ECON. J. 855 (2005); Glenn Blomquist, Self-Protection and Averting Behavior, Values of 
Statistical Lives, and Benefit Cost Analysis of Environmental Policy,  2 REV. OF ECON. OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD 89 (2004);  Nil Adote Abrahams, Bryan J. Hubbell & Jeffrey L. Jordon, Joint 
Production and Averting Expenditure Measures of Willingness to Pay: Do Water Expenditures 
Really Measure Avoidance Costs?, 82 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 427 (2000); C.W. Abdalla, B.A. 
Roach & D.J. Epp, Valuing Environmental Quality Changes Using Averting Expenditures: An 
Application to Groundwater Contamination,  68 LAND ECON. 163 (1992); Timothy Bartik, 
Evaluating the Benefits of Non-marginal Reductions in Pollution Using Information on 
Defensive Expenditures, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 111 (1988); P.N. Courant & R.C. 
Porter, Averting Expenditure and the Cost of Pollution, 8 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 321 (1981). 
 17. Dockins et al., supra note 14. 
 18. Patricia Anderson, Kristin Butcher & Phillip Levin, Maternal Employment and 
Overweight Children, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7880, 2002); KAY 
CREPINSEK & NANCY BURNSTEIN, MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN’S NUTRITION 
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children are eating more meals outside the home and consuming 
fewer fruits and vegetables.19 Changes in the relative cost of land, 
labor, and transportation—as well as developments in trade law—are 
resulting in significant changes in the sources of fruits and vegetables 
consumed in the United States.  Between 2000 and 2005, U.S. fruits 
imports increased twenty-two percent and U.S. vegetable imports 
increased forty percent.20  These trends have implications for dietary 
pesticide exposure assessment.  Economists have models and data 
sources that can help federal agencies track changes in dietary 
exposure that occur over time as result of changing trade patterns. 
In the case of air pollution, a failure to take behavior into 
account could lead to regulations that provide inadequate protection 
for children’s health.21  EPA risk assessments look to epidemiological 
studies for both dose-response relationships between air pollution 
and health outcomes and baseline health conditions.  Epidemiologists 
use the relationship between daily hospital admissions and ozone 
levels to estimate these dose-response functions.  If these studies do 
not take into account the extent to which people stay indoors on bad 
air quality days, they will underestimate the impacts of air pollution 
on health.22  If people did not limit their activities, there would be 
more hospitalizations.  Air pollution regulations based on these dose-
response functions will be more lax than if the behavior were more 
accurately represented.  Further, the benefits of air quality 
improvements could also be underestimated because the baseline 
health estimates do not reflect the health effects of staying indoors.23  
It is conceivable that an improvement in air quality could leave 
 
VOL. I, MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN’S NUTRITION  1(Economic Research 
Service, Electronic Publication for the Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Program 
EFAN04006-1) (2004),  available at 
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan04006/efan04006-1/efan04006-1.pdf. 
 19. Wen You, Parental Time and Children’s Obesity Measures: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University) (on file with 
Texas A&M University). 
 20. Sandra Hoffmann, Remarks at Resources for the Future (RFF) First Wednesday 
Series: Achieving a Safe Food Supply in Increasingly Global Markets (June 7, 2006), 
www.rff.org/rff/Events/Achieving-Food_Supply-Global-Market.cfm. 
 21. See Carol Mansfield et al., supra note 16. 
 22. Brian W. Bresnahan, Mark Dickie, and Shelby Gerking,  Averting Behavior and Urban 
Air Pollution,  73 LAND ECONOMICS  34-57 (1997), M. Neidell, Air Pollution, Health, and 
Socioeconomic Status: the Effect of Outdoor Air Quality on Childhood Asthma,  23 J. OF 
HEALTH ECONOMICS 1083-1316 (2004). 
 23. See also Jane Hall, Victor Brajer, and Frederick Lurmann, Economic Valuation of 
Ozone-related School Absences in the South Coast Air Basin of California, 21 CONTEMPORARY 
ECON. POL. 407 (2003). 
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asthma-related hospital admissions unchanged, but result in a 
significant increase in the time children spend in rigorous outdoor 
activity.  In a era when we are facing an epidemic in childhood 
obesity, these benefits of better air quality could be significant. 
The impact of environmental quality on children’s health is 
heavily influenced by choices made by their parents. ’ One of the 
limitations faced by environmental economists, and therefore 
agencies, in studying these choices is a lack of data on family 
decisions that influence children’s exposure to environmental 
hazards.  Two promising efforts to include social science questions in 
national children’s health surveys may help to fill this data gap. 
First, EPA is currently working to incorporate questions on 
averting behavior relevant to children’s environmental health into 
future National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys 
(NHANES).24 Second, a new longitudinal study called The National 
Children’s Study is being designed. This study would follow a panel of 
children and their families through the first 20 years of the children’s 
lives.25  There are plans to integrate socioeconomic data collection 
into this study to improve understanding of the way family behavior 
influences children’s exposure to environmental hazards and 
influences the consequences of that exposure. The National 
Children’s Study has been through a multi-year planning process.  
Data collection is scheduled to begin in 2008.  Continuation of the 
study through completion is subject to annual Congressional 
appropriations.26  A similar economic survey, The Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), has been collecting economic and 
 
 24. EPA is working to incorporate questions on families’ efforts to protect asthmatic 
children from air pollution in the 2007-2008 NHANES survey.  Memorandum from the EPA 
Advisory Comm., Integrating Economics with Existing Health Surveys (Aug. 2003); Interview 
with Montira Ponsiri, EPA Office of Research and Development (Winter 2006).  NHANES are 
nationwide surveys conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease 
Control (NCHS/CDC). These surveys are designed to assess the health and nutritional status of 
adults and children in the United States through interviews and direct physical examinations. 
They are conducted on a periodic basis to allow for assessment of health changes over time. 
NHANES II and III were carried out from 1976 to 1980 and from 1988 to 1994, respectively. 
U.S. National Library of Medicine, Communications Engineering Branch, NHANES 
http://archive.nlm.nih.gov/proj/dxpnet/nhanes/nhanes.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). 
 25. The National Children’s Study, http://www.nationalchildrensstudy.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2007). 
 26. Personal communication with Sarah Keim, National Institutes of Health, March 23, 
2007. 
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sociological data on panels of families since 1968.27  This data 
collection effort has been crucial to our understanding of the impact 
of changing economic conditions on families, particularly poor 
families.28 
BEYOND RISK ASSESSMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL 
ANALYSIS FOR POLICY DESIGN AND EVALUATION 
A better understanding of behavior is also critical to improving 
policy design and evaluation. If we can gain a firm grasp on likely 
behavioral response to policies, we can help avoid unintended 
consequences of policy initiatives.  For example, lead paint disclosure 
rules are intended to provide parents with information that can 
prevent them from purchasing homes that contain conditions that 
might be hazardous to their children’s health. However, the rules 
could also cause home-owning parents not to test for lead, to ignore 
the problem, or worse, to remove lead paint improperly out of 
concern that the presence of lead paint or knowledge of its presence 
could lower their home’s resale value. Regulators need to know how 
households are likely to respond to lead paint rules or abatement 
assistance in order to effectively structure lead paint policies. 
Economists have contributions to make here and in designing and 
evaluating other environmental policies. 
III.  THAT SIDE OF  
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: BENEFITS VALUTION 
Of course, environmental economics also has another, well-
known side. The legal literature on valuation of health and ecological 
benefits of environmental programs is extensive and often 
acrimonious.29 Much of this discussion focuses on normative issues 
about the appropriateness of valuing reductions in health risks and 
the normative position of welfare economics among the many forms 
of consequentialism and other perspectives on social ethics.30 My focus 
 
 27. See Panel Study of Income Dynamics, http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Jan. 
19, 2007) (PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of close to 8,000 U.S. families 
run by the University of Michigan and funded by multiple federal agencies.). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, On the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law 35 
ENVTL. L. 135, 173 (2005) (reviewing FRANK ACKERMAN AND LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: 
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)). 
 30. See generally DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (John Pencavel ed., 1996) (providing an introduction into 
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is much more limited and practical. Given that agencies are legally 
charged with valuing the benefits of economically significant rules, 
what special issues arise for benefits valuation when the rules 
disproportionately affect children’s the health of children?31 
Theoretically, when economists measure the benefits of any 
public program, they are trying to capture the aggregate change in the 
welfare of all members of society attributable to the program. A 
useful way to think about cataloging the benefits of any 
environmental policy is to think broadly about who benefits and 
how.32  A wider range of people benefit from programs protecting 
children’s health than we might expect on first thought. Obviously 
children benefit directly, but so do their parents, by, for example, 
spending less time and fewer resources caring for sick children. They 
may benefit because a healthy child may be better able to invest in his 
or her own human capital and, as a result, be in a better position to 
care for the parents as they grow old. Parents also benefit because 
they care about their children.33 Economists distinguish between two 
types of caring for others, paternalistic and non-paternalistic. 
Paternalistic altruism is utility derived from another’s consumption. 
Non-paternalistic altruism is utility derived from another’s own 
utility. Parents have paternalistic concern for their children when they 
care about their children’s health or consumption in and of itself, not 
because of what the child likes. A classic example of paternalistic 
caring is the parent’s admonishment, “Eat your spinach. I don’t care 
if you don’t like it. It’s good for you.”  Parents have non-paternalistic 
 
the relationship between economic theory and moral philosophy); CONSEQUENTIALISM AND 
ITS CRITICS, (Samuel Scheffler ed. 1988) (describing consequentialism, which is a set of 
positions in ethics that normative value depends only on consequences).  On the issue of 
valuation specifically, see INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL 
REASON (Ruth Chang ed., Harvard U. Press 1998); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and 
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
 31. See Sandra Hoffmann et al., Economic Uncertainties in Valuing Reductions in 
Children’s Environmental Health Risks, in, ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH RISKS TO CHILDREN 207 (Pascale Scapecchi ed., 2006) (discussing other commonly 
used health measures and valuing reductions in environmental risks to children’s health, in 
particular cost-of-illness and Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)). 
 32. Conceptually, a lawyer could think of this in these terms of who has standing to be 
counted in environmental health benefits assessment and what counts as benefits. The answer 
from conventional welfare economics is that everyone in society has standing and their own, 
individual welfare or utility is what counts. 
 33. Tort law recognizes this direct contribution of children to parents’ well-being explicitly 
when it allows parents to recover damages for the emotional distress of witnessing a child’s 
tortuous injury.  See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (allowing parents to recover 
damages for the emotional distress of witnessing a child’s tortuous injury). 
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concern for their children when they care about the child’s 
consumption or health because it makes the child happy. 
Other people, including siblings, extended family members, 
friends, and even complete strangers, may also benefit from 
protection of children’s health. Like parents, they may benefit 
directly because fewer resources must be devoted to caring for sick 
children. They may also have paternalistic and non-paternalistic 
concern for specific children or for children in general. And in most 
cases, these other individuals will benefit from increases in the 
contributions children may be able to make to their family or to 
society because they are in better health. This spillover of benefits to 
society-at-large is one of the primary justifications for public 
expenditures on public health and education for children. 
It is likely that the story is even more complex than this.  
Children may care about the way their health affects others.  Children 
may care because their health may affect their parents’ health or the 
stability of their parents’ marriage–a form of paternalistic altruism.  
Children may even have non-paternalistically altruistic feelings 
toward their parents!34 At this point I see my fellow economists 
throwing up their hands in despair because they know how hard it is 
simply to get decent measures of the most direct effects of health on 
children’s welfare.  But this does suggest that our empirical measures 
may be conservative in scope. 
Economists have long debated the appropriateness of 
considering altruistically motivated benefits in measures of program 
benefits.35  Economists now widely accept that as a general rule, non-
paternalistic preferences should be excluded because one person’s 
utility gets double counted—once in their own and once in another’s 
utility function.36 On the other hand, paternalistically altruistic 
preferences should be included because they do not involve this kind 
of double counting.37 Instead, they are purely the other person’s own 
 
 34. See William Harbaugh & Kate Krause, Children’s Altruism in Public Good and 
Dictator Experiments, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 95, 107 (2000). 
 35. See Theodore Bergstrom, Benefit-Cost in a Benevolent Society, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 
2006, at 339, 347–48 (providing a recent survey). 
 36. Theodore Bergstrom, When Is a Man’s Life Worth More than His Human Capital? 16–
18 (Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of Cal., Santa Barbara, Paper No. 1982d).  But see supra note 35 at 348 
(noting some qualifications to the conclusion). 
 37. M.W. Jones-Lee, Paternalistic Altruism and the Value of Statistical Life, 102 ECON. J. 
80, 89 (1992). 
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direct benefit from the program outcomes.38  A practical problem is 
that economists have found it difficult to develop empirical methods 
for distinguishing between these two types of altruistic preferences.39 
As a result, the tendency has been to exclude both and settle for a 
potentially more conservative estimate of program ’benefits.  EPA 
interim guidance recommends using parents’ WTP to reduce 
children’s health risk as a measure of the benefit of environmental 
programs that protect children’s health.  There has been some debate 
among environmental economists about whether this over-estimates 
program benefits because it may be motivated in part by non-
paternalistic altruism.40 
The catalog of beneficiaries of programs protecting adult health 
or ecosystems is no less complex than that for children. In practice, 
this complexity is typically ignored. Is this complexity more critical in 
obtaining a decent, first-order approximation of the benefits of 
children’s environmental health programs than it is for other 
environmental health programs?  I maintain that it is because 
 
 38. A little formal notation can help give a rough sense of the reason for this distinction. 
Let hc denote a child’s health or safety and xc denote the child’s consumption of all goods and 
services. The utility the child derives from consumption and health and safety can be denoted 
uc(xc, hc); i.e., the child’s utility depends on the child’s health (hc) and consumption of other 
goods (xc). Parents benefit directly from increased protection of children’s health because they 
can spend less time and fewer resources caring for the sick child and more on other things they 
want. Let xp denote a parent’s total consumption of goods and leisure. The fact that this depends 
on the child’s health is denoted xp(hc). The parent’s direct benefit (or utility) from a 
environmental health program that targets children is then denoted up(xp(hc)). Their benefits 
that accrue from paternalistic and nonpaternalistic altruism related to their children’s health can 
be denoted up(hc) and up(uc(hc)), respectively. A parent’s total benefit from the program 
therefore depends on how the parent’s own direct consumption changes as well as the utility the 
parent gets from knowing that the child is healthier and happier; i.e., Up = up(xp(hc), hc, uc(xc, hc)). 
Total welfare for a parent and a child could be denoted as some function W that depends on the 
utility of the parent and child; i.e., W=W(uc(xc, hc),up(xp(hc) hc, uc(xc, hc))). This function illustrates 
in a highly simplified way why economists believe non-paternalistic preferences should not be 
included in measuring the benefits of a policy—in this case, the child’s utility is double 
counted—once on his or her own and once in the non-paternalistically altruistic parent’s utility 
(italics are added to highlight this repetition).  Note that the paternalistic preference over their 
children’s health, up(xc, hc), is not repeated in this welfare function. 
Once strategic behavior between spouses or divorce is taken into account, the story 
becomes even more complex. See generally Theodore Bergstrom, Benefit Cost Analysis and the 
Entanglements of Love (Nov. 1, 2003)(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of 
Cal., Santa Barbara, Dep’t of Econ.)(providing a nice summary of the implications of 
alternative family arrangements and alternative roles for extended family and strangers for 
benefit–cost analysis in societies where people care about one another’s consumption, health, or 
happiness). 
 39. Supra note 8 at 2-7, 2-8. 
 40. Discussion at the O.E.C.D. Workshop on the Valuation of Environmental Health Risks 
for Children (Sept. 11-12, 2003). 
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children are not little adults, either socially or developmentally. And 
as a result, the obligations and concerns of others in society toward 
children are different than those toward other adults or possibly even 
nature. 
IV.  WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?  
LESSONS FOR ECONOMISTS FROM INFORMED CONSENT 
Economics is based on a commitment to consumer sovereignty, 
and so economists prefer to base estimates of the value of reducing 
health risks on individuals’ own WTP to reduce risk to themselves. 
The normative appeal of consumer sovereignty rests on individuals’ 
ability to make informed, rational judgments about the choices they 
confront. But childhood is defined by the process of gaining the 
experience, cognitive ability, and judgment needed to make such 
choices, as well as the judgment and experience to make decisions 
about managing financial resources. The problem facing economists is 
similiar to that faced by the legal system: at what point and for what 
purposes should a child’s judgment be taken seriously, or when 
should a minor be bound by his or her decisions or held responsible 
for his or her actions?  A close analogy for the problem faced in 
environmental health valuation is the place of children’s wishes in 
informed consent for medical treatment and participation in research. 
The requirement of informed consent to medical procedures was 
first established in the 1957 case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. 
University Board of Trustees.41  The patient in Salgo was not informed 
of the risks associated with a contrast medium used in an aortogram. 
The California Appeals Court held that a patient’s consent was not 
legally effective if it was not “informed.” In surveying the legal, 
philosophical, regulatory, medical, and psychological literatures, Ruth 
Faden and Tom Beauchamp identify the central elements of informed 
consent as (1) disclosure, (2) comprehension, (3) voluntariness, (4) 
competence, and (5) consent.42  A long line of cases has resulted in a 
fairly settled body of law about the kind of information that must be 
disclosed to have legally effective consent. The required information 
includes “the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment; the risks 
and consequences of the proposed treatment; reasonably feasible 
 
 41. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d, 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1957). 
 42. RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 274 (1986). 
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alternatives; and the prognosis if the recommended treatment is not 
provided.”43 
Not surprisingly, the information required for adequate 
disclosure closely resemble the kinds of information that are usually 
considered in risk analysis. Typically, a rational decision about 
uncertain outcomes should consider the nature of likely alternative 
outcomes, their consequences, the likelihood of alternative outcomes, 
and the benefits or costs of the consequences to the decision maker. 
A diverse and growing literature on child development, adolescent 
psychology, and decision-making under uncertainty is exploring 
children’s development of competence to make these assessments. 
The developmental psychology literature offers a mixed picture 
of children’s ability to assess expected outcomes. Schlottmann (2001) 
found that children as young as five or six have a functional 
understanding of probability and expected value.44 Schlottmann and 
Anderson (1994) show that children as young as five use information 
on both likelihood and “size of prize” in assessing gambles.45 Yet in 
other studies, children as old as eleven were found to have difficulties 
comprehending the standard gamble used to develop QALYs.46  
Harbaugh and coauthors (2002) conducted an interesting set of 
experiments to test whether age influences the choices individuals 
make under uncertainty.47 They asked participants from the ages of 
five to sixty-four to make choices between a simple gamble and a 
certain outcome. They found strong evidence that children use 
probability weights in assessing uncertain outcomes, but they use 
them very differently from adults. Consistent with most other 
experimental research on adults, they find that adults tend to 
overweight low-probability events and underweight high-probability 
ones. In contrast, children underweighted low-probability events and 
overweighted high-probability ones.  Children were found to take 
more risks than adults when facing low probabilities of large losses.  
 
 43. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE TEXTBOOK COMMITTEE, LEGAL 
MEDICINE 344 (S. Sandy Sanbar et al. eds., 6th ed. 2004). 
 44. Anne Schlottmann, Children’s Probability Intuitions: Understanding the Expected Value 
of Complex Gambles, 72 CHILD DEV. 103, 103 (2001). 
 45. Anne Schlottman & Norman Anderson, Children’s Judgments of Expected Value, 30 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 56, 65 (1994). 
 46. E.F. Juniper et al., Minimum Skills Required by Children to Complete Health-Related 
Quality of Life Instruments for Asthma: Comparison of Measurement Properties, 10 EUROPEAN 
RESPIRATORY J. 2285, 2292-93 (1997). 
 47. William Harbaugh et al., Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices over Small and 
Large Probability Gains and Losses, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 53, 60–69 (2002). 
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Yet children also used large, subjective probability weights, which 
decreased with age. This finding is consistent with a finding by 
Fischhoff and coauthors (2000) that adolescents tend to overestimate 
their chances of premature death.48  On the whole, the evidence on 
children’s use of probabilities suggests that children have some of the 
same cognitive biases as adults, but also that these biases decrease as 
the child matures. 
The abilities of individuals to identify outcomes associated with 
risks and their understanding of these outcomes should influence 
their judgments about risk taking. A recent review of research shows 
that young adolescents are able to identify negative consequences 
associated with medical procedures and risky behavior, and that this 
ability increases with age. Overall, the levels of competence in 
identifying risks among adolescents are not high relative to adults.49 
The meaning a child or adolescent attaches to a negative outcome 
may also change with age. One illustration of this is the well-studied 
area of how children and adolescents conceive of death. Carey (1985), 
reviewing literature on children’s conceptual understanding of death, 
finds that children under five typically view death to be similar to 
sleep; elementary school children understand the finality of death, but 
not its inevitability. By the age of nine or ten, children seem to 
understand death as both terminal and inevitable.50  In contrast, 
children seem as competent as adults at conveying the severity of 
symptoms they are currently experiencing.51 
Finally, judgments about risks and risk taking require an ability 
to integrate and draw inferences from information on likelihoods, 
outcomes, and severity. A National Academy of Science Workshop, 
which was convened to synthesize recent research on adolescent 
health and development, noted recent research showing that 
“children’s capacities for logic, reasoning, and planning continue to 
grow throughout adolescence, as do their problem-solving skills and 
capacity to understand the long-term consequences of their 
 
 48. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Teen Expectations for Significant Life Events, 64 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 189, 196–98 (2000). 
 49. Susan Millstein & Bonnie Halpern-Felsher, Perceptions of Risk and Vulnerability, 31 J. 
OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 10, 22–24 (2002) 
 50. SUSAN CAREY, CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN CHILDHOOD 60–65 (1985). See also Brenda 
L. Kenyon, Current Research in Children’s Conceptions of Death: A Critical Review, 43 J. OF 
DEATH AND DYING 69 (2001). 
 51. Stavros Petrou, Methodological Issues Raised by Preference-Based Approaches to 
Measuring the Health Status of Children, 12 HEALTH ECON. 697 (2003). 
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behavior.”52 New research is showing that the malleability of the 
neural system during puberty manifests itself in commonly observed 
“affective changes—ranging from increased sexual interest and 
emotional intensity to risk-taking and sensation seeking.”53 Earlier 
onset of puberty coupled with incomplete cognitive development 
“make adolescents particularly vulnerable to emotional and 
behavioral difficulties (e.g., depression, social anxiety), regulation of 
appetite and reward motivation (e.g., substance abuse, eating 
disorders), and impulsivity (e.g., antisocial behavior, excessive risk 
taking).54  Effectively, there is a biological disjunction between 
novelty and sensation seeking and the development of self-regulatory 
competence.55 
From an economist’s perspective, these results from the 
psychology literature suggest that adolescents and children probably 
discount future outcomes more highly than adults. A person has a 
high discount rate if they prefer consumption today to consumption 
tomorrow. A high discount rate could be explained by belief in a high 
chance of premature death.56  It could also be explained by impatience 
or a low level of self-regulatory competence.57  The few studies that 
directly compare the discount rates of adults and children find that 
children and adolescents do have higher discount rates than adults.58 
Some studies find that teenagers and young adults who engage in 
risky behavior also have higher discount rates than those who do 
not.59 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of theoretical economic studies 
examined the efficiency properties of Arrow-Debreau contingent 
claims markets (a theoretical representation of insurance or futures 
markets). These studies established that when risk perceptions 
change or better risk information is revealed over time, insurance and 
 
 52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A STUDY OF INTERACTIONS: EMERGING ISSUES IN 
THE SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE WORKSHOP SUMMARY 6 (2006). 
 53. Id. at 8. 
 54. Id. at 8–9. 
 55. Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 1021 ANN. 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51, 54 (2004).  But see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADOLESCENT RISK 
AND VULNERABILITY: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT 1–2 (2001). 
 56. See supra note 48. 
 57. See Steinberg, supra note 55. 
 58. See Kate Krause & William Harbaugh, Economic Experiments that You Can Perform at 
Home on Your Children 14 (Univ.of Or. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 1999-1, 1999). 
 59. See, e.g., Harrell Chesson et al., Discount Rates and Risky Sexual Behaviors among 
Teenagers and Young Adults, 32 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 217, 227–28 (2006). 
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futures markets produce intertemporally inefficient allocations.60 
Harbaugh (1999) argues that the pervasive transformation of 
children’s immature appreciation of risk of illness and death into 
future adult risk aversion effectively creates a form of failure in 
intertemporal markets, with children demanding too little safety 
relative to their mature selves.61 Restrictions on children’s range of 
choice, or rules that allow contracts entered by children to be voided, 
are ways of correcting this market failure and are in line with the core 
principles underlying the law of children and informed consent.62 
The law of informed consent is being influenced by 
developments in child psychology as well as wider cultural views 
about the autonomy of children. In general, both convention and the 
weight of evidence from the psychology literature suggests that most 
children lack the capacity to give informed consent, although this 
capacity develops through adolescence into young adulthood. In 
almost all states, children under 18 are viewed as minors who are 
incompetent to give informed consent to medical procedures or 
participation in research, although exceptions are increasing.63 
In the case of a patient’s incompetence, the goals of informed 
consent are pursued by engaging a proxy decision maker who acts for 
the patient.64 Parents generally have the authority to make medical 
 
 60. Ross Starr, Optimal Production and Allocation under Uncertainty, 87 QUARTERLY J. 
OF ECON. 81 (1973); Richard Harris, Ex-Post Efficiency and Resource Allocation Under 
Uncertainty, 45 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 427 (1978); Richard Harris and Nancy Olewiler, The 
Welfare Economics of Ex-Post Optimality, 46 ECONOMICA 137 (1979); Peter Hammond, Ex-
Ante and Ex-Post Optimality under Uncertainty, 48 ECONOMICA 235 (1981); Peter Hammond, 
Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 159 (1976). 
 61. William Harbaugh, Valuing Children’s Health and Life: What Does Economic Theory 
Say about Including Parental and Societal Willingness to Pay? 4–5 (Univ. of Or. Dep’t of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2001-13, 2001). 
 62. For example, most states ban sale of tobacco products to minors.  See Julie A. Fishman 
et al., State Laws on Tobacco Control—United States, 1998, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 21, 26–27 (1999).  In measuring WTP, economists are also interested in the 
ability of the consumer to make rational choices about financial management. In most states, 
contracts entered by minors are generally voidable at the insistence of the minor.  See E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 214-24 (1982). 
 63. There is a significant body of literature arguing that the view of majority at 18 being a 
bright line with a few exceptions is erroneous and providing a thorough discussion of the rights 
and legal obligations of teenagers and informed consent. See JESSICA BERG ET AL., INFORMED 
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 97–98 (2d ed. 2001); JAMES MORRISSEY 
ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 30–32 (1986); CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (Gary 
Melton et al. eds., 1983). 
 64. JESSICA BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL 
PRACTICE 95 (2d ed. 2001). 
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decisions for minor children as a matter of U.S. constitutional law and 
state law.65 This authority is based in the nature of the family and 
reflects an interest both in the rights of the parents and the welfare of 
the child. Parents are generally presumed to be most likely to know 
the interests and values of the child and to act in the child’s best 
interest.66  But in cases of neglect or abuse by parents, the state has a 
duty to step into the parent’s shoes to act in its role as parens patriae.67 
The past 40 years have seen significant shifts in views on the 
Constitutional status of children generally and as related to informed 
consent specifically. In a 1969 case recognizing the rights of 
schoolchildren to free speech under the First Amendment, Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme 
Court declared for the first time that children are “persons under our 
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the 
State must respect.”68  In other cases during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Court upheld children’s constitutional rights to privacy in abortion 
 
 65. BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §4.3-4.5 (1995). See also WHO SPEAKS FOR THE 
CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds., 1982). 
 66. Prince v.  Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–66 (1944), rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 804 
(1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH 
LAW 725–26 (1995). See JAMES MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE 
HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1986) for the historical perspective on the 
development of law pertaining to minors in the United States. The position of the child in 
colonial law was less child-centered than contemporary cases might indicate. Early colonial law 
viewed the parent as sovereign. “Children had no constitutional or protective rights of their 
own, and parents had almost absolute autonomy in respect to their minor offspring and hence 
almost complete control.” Id. at 2. The philosophic view was that children owed their parents 
obedient respect to repay their physical and emotional nurturance. “The emphasis was on the 
future and on molding the child to grow up—for the good of the community—into a God-
fearing, self-supporting citizen.” Id. at 3.  In the 19th and early 20th century, parental 
sovereignty gave way to a view of the child as dependent and immature with age-specific 
developmental needs.  A view that drew on new theories of child development. Emotional 
nurturance in early years gained as much importance as preparation for work and spiritual care. 
Overtly objectionable conditions for child labor in early industrial settings and technological 
advances that reduced the need for unskilled labor all contributed to emergence of the “child 
welfare” perspective in American law pertaining to minors. State-imposed boundaries on 
parental prerogatives toward children gradually emerged, including compulsory education and 
restrictions on child labor. “For the first time, the state recognized the child’s needs as separate 
from family needs and interests. Indeed, the state replaced parents as the final arbiter of child 
welfare parameters.” Id. at 4. 
 67. Literally, “parent of the country.” This is a common law concept inherited from pre-
colonial law. Clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect is generally needed for the state 
to take custody and is required under the U.S. Constitution to terminate parental rights 
permanently. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-69 (1982). See also, BARRY FURROW ET 
AL., HEALTH LAW § 17-34 (1995)(explaining application of the parens patriae concept when 
parents deny their children adequate medical care). 
 68. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
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decisions and to due process in juvenile-detention decisions.69  Many 
states also allow “mature” minors (defined as those old enough and 
having enough discretion to be able to understand the proposed 
treatment and the consequences of the treatment decision) to make 
urgent treatment decisions when parents are unavailable.70 During the 
1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have retreated 
from pursuing the path of “child as autonomous person” into what 
has been characterized as a “child under permanent custody” view.71  
An important innovation that could stand between the child as 
autonomous person view of Tinker72 and Supreme Court cases of the 
1970s and the child under permanent custody view of more recent 
cases is the notion that even though a child, particularly an 
adolescent, may not have the competence to authorize treatment or 
participation in research, the law of informed consent could require 
that their views be heard.73  Federal regulation governing informed 
consent from children acting as research subjects takes this position, 
requiring both the parents’ or guardians’ authorization and the child’s 
assent.74 
What lessons can be drawn from this discussion of children and 
the modern law of informed consent? As a broad rule, the legal 
system looks to parents to speak for their children. However, there is 
growing recognition of the right of children, particularly older 
children, to at least be heard, and in some cases, of their right to 
autonomous decision-making. We should not overlook, though, the 
role of the state as the final arbiter for children’s welfare. This speaks 
 
 69. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (finding 
a Missouri statute requiring a minor female to acquire parental consent for an abortion to 
violate her right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution); see also In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 13 
(1967) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to juvenile 
proceedings because such proceedings could result in loss of liberty to the child). There is a 
substantial body of literature in social sciences and the law on the “rights of the child.” For an 
overview, see JOSEPH HAWES, THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF 
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (1991), and MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005). For an insightful analysis of the history of late-20th-century 
children’s rights cases, see LAURENCE HOULGATE, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, STATE 
INTERVENTION, CUSTODY AND DIVORCE: CONTRADICTIONS IN ETHICS AND FAMILY LAW 
(2005). 
 70.  Supra note 46 at 347. 
 71. HOULGATE, supra note 69. 
 72. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
 73. See, e.g., In re Green, 92 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 
205, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 74. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408. See also BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 23-7 (1995). 
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of the importance of children to society as a whole, and points to the 
significant investments strangers make in children.  
V.  BACK TO ECONOMICS: WHAT DO WE KNOW EMPIRICALLY 
ABOUT PARENTS’ AND OTHERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO PROTECT 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH? 
Empirical studies estimating WTP to protect children from 
environmental health hazards have almost exclusively looked at the 
question from a parent’s perspective. Scapecchi (2006) recently 
reviewed the small literature on valuation of parental WTP to protect 
children’s health.75  These studies span the three classes of risk 
generally addressed in environmental health valuation: reduction in 
mortality risk, in risk of acute illness, and in risk of chronic illness.76 
All the studies show that parents are willing to pay more to protect 
their children’s health and survival than they are to protect their 
own.77 Three studies, all examining precautionary purchases to 
estimate WTP to reduce mortality risks, find parents willing to pay 
more to protect their children’s health than the typical adult is to 
protect his or her own.78 Bolmquist and coauthors (1996) found that 
the actions of parents of children age five and under imply that they 
were willing to pay significantly more to keep their children from 
being in a fatal or nonfatal motor vehicle accident than was the 
typical adult.79  Mount and coauthors (2000) estimate the values of 
statistical life (VSLs) for children, adults, and the elderly based on 
family automobile purchases. These investigators find that the VSL of 
a child is only slightly higher than that of an adult, but significantly 
greater than that of the elderly.80 Three studies, using both stated 
 
 75. Pascale Scapecchi, Valuation Differences between Adults and Children, in ECONOMIC 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISKS TO CHILDREN 79 (Pascale Scapecchi ed., 
2006). 
 76. Id. at 82. 
 77. Id. at 101. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Glenn Blomquist et al., Values of Risk Reduction Implied by Motorist Use of Protection 
Equipment, 30 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y.  55, 63 (1996) (finding that adults still value children 
more than themselves, even when controlling for different life spans). 
 80. Timothy Mount, et al., Automobile Safety and the Value of Statistical Life in the Family: 
Valuing Reduced Risks for Children, Adults and the Elderly 1, 24 (paper presented at the 2001 
Assoc. of Envtl. and Resource Econ. Workshop, Bar Harbor, Maine, June 13-15, 2001)(using 
family automobile purchase data to estimate WTP for reduction in mortality risk for different 
age groups, they find a VSL of $7.3 million for children, $7.2 million for adults, and $5.2 million 
for the elderly). But see Robin R. Jenkins et al., Valuing Reduced Risks to Children: The Cause 
of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y. 397 (2001) (estimating that the VSL for 
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preference and market behavior, find that parents are willing to pay 
about twice as much to prevent an episode of acute illness for their 
children as they are for themselves.81 Two contingent valuation 
studies also find evidence that parents are willing to pay more to 
reduce risk of chronic illness for their children than for themselves. 
Viscusi and coauthors (1987) find that parents of young children are 
willing to pay more than adults without children to reduce risk of 
injury from household pesticides. Dickie and Gerkin (2001) find that 
parents are willing to pay twice as much to reduce the risk of non-
melanoma skin cancer from solar radiation exposure for their 
children as for themselves. 
Research comparing valuation of children’s health to adults is a 
relatively young literature.  One regularity is that parents seem 
willing to pay significantly more to protect their children’s health than 
their own.  More research is needed to determine why this is the case.  
It may be simply that parents are counting the health of the two 
people, but more likely, this result reflects a sense of protectiveness 
towards children, or what economists study as altruism.’ 
VI.  PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A LAW AND ECONOMICS VIEW ON 
A REASONABLE MEASURE OF CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH BENEFITS 
What then do we want to capture in a measure of change in 
society’s welfare that comes from reducing environmental risks to 
children’s health? Looking back to our model of social welfare and 
the way society’s various members benefit from protecting children’s 
health, I have said nothing in this article to suggest that we do not 
 
younger children is higher than for older, but concluding that adult VSL is higher than either 
children’s category). 
 81. Jin-Tan Lieu et al. Mother’s Willingness to Pay for Her Own and Her Child’s Health: A 
Contingent Valuation Study In Taiwan, 9 Health Econ. 319, 325 (2000) (finding a Tiawanese 
mother’s WTP to prevent a cold in her child is approximately twice as large as her WTP to 
prevent a cold in herself); Mark Agee & Thomas Crocker, Smoking Parents’ Valuations of Own 
and Children’s Health (paper presented at the Assoc. of Envt. and Resource Econ. 2001 
Workshop, Assessing and Managing Environmental and Public Health Risks) (estimating 
parents’ annual WTP for an increase in health services for themselves and their children, as well 
as parents’ WTP to reduce their child’s daily exposure to second hand tobacco smoke). They 
found that parents value reduction in risks to their own child’s health twice as much as their 
own.  Id.  See also  M. Dickie & V.L. Ulery, Valuing Health in the Household: Are Kids Worth 
More than Parents? (paper presented at the Assoc. of Envt. and Resource Econ. 2001 
Workshop, Assessing and Managing Environmental and Public Health Risks) (finding parents’ 
WTP to be about twice as much to have their children avoid an episode of acute illness than to 
avoid it themselves). 
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care about the benefits to children, parents, other family members, or 
even strangers. The issue, somewhat similar to the issue in informed 
consent, is who speaks for these members of society. The answer I 
propose gives weight to the legal and ethical concerns evidenced in 
the law of minors and informed consent. And it also gives weight to 
the practical and technical concerns of economists who are trying to 
determine how to measure something that is very difficult to quantify. 
First, the law of informed consent supports the position of EPA’s 
Children’s Health Valuation Handbook, that parents, not children, 
should speak for the child.82 The law, however, supports the position 
in a way that is contrary to the standard results in the economics 
literature. Rather than the non-paternalistic preferences of parents 
serving to double count the preferences of children, as would be the 
case in a standard environmental valuation problem, here they 
actually reflect the legal duty of parents to represent their children’s 
interests and preferences. Parents are expected to speak for the child 
because they are emotionally impelled and legally required to act in 
the child’s best interest. In other words, they are expected to, and in 
all likelihood generally do, reflect paternalistic altruism toward their 
children in their choices. But they are also expected to speak for the 
child because they are in the best position to understand and care 
about the decision’s impact on the child’s happiness. Here they are 
expected to, and generally do, reflect non-paternalistic altruism 
toward their children in their choices. Because the preferences of 
children are not independently measured, they are not double 
counted in the parent’s WTP. 
Second, the more recent cases on children’s rights and the law of 
informed consent suggest some potential innovations for studies that 
value reductions in risk to children’s health. Parental choices are not 
transparent reflections of children’s preferences, but they do take the 
preferences into account. The courts and federal agencies have 
suggested that in important decisions about children’s health, 
particularly older children’s health, explicit processes should be in 
place to allow the child’s perspective to be heard. Consideration 
might be given to doing this in valuation studies. One possibility could 
draw on the finding that children have been found capable of 
accurately reflecting their current level of comfort or discomfort on 
QALY indices.83 Perhaps QALY indices could be used to help inform 
 
 82. Supra note 8. 
 83. See Petrou, supra note 51. 
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parents about the generic comfort level of children in much the same 
way they are used to inform treatment decisions. One difficulty in 
implementing this suggestion is that it would likely need to be done in 
the context of a stated-preference or stated-choice study. A 
methodological challenge in this, as in many social science surveys, is 
to encourage respondents to accurately reflect their true position 
rather than giving socially acceptable responses. Use of children’s 
preferences to inform parents could reinforce the socially acceptable 
response—“I’d do anything for my kids”—when in reality, all parents 
face constraints of time and material resources. 
Third, informed consent is not the same as assessing the changes 
in social welfare resulting from a new public policy. The role the state 
plays as a final defense for children where parents fail to protect them 
indicates that children are important to members of society other 
than parents. The work of Nancy Folbre and other feminist 
economists restates a long-recognized fact in economics.84  Significant 
external benefits (and sometimes costs), which are shared by all 
members of society, accrue from investing in children. Individuals 
who do not have children regularly vote to burden themselves with 
higher tax bills through school bond issues and general taxes that pay 
for public programs that invest in children’s health, safety, and 
education. As with measurement of the value of other public goods, 
there does appear to be a danger that including the WTP of non-
parents may result in double counting of children’s own utility. After 
all, parents are likely already reflecting children’s feelings in their 
decisions and statements. One solution is to view the WTP of parents 
as a conservative measure of societal WTP to reduce environmental 
risks to children’s health. A measure that includes the WTP of others 
in addition to parents might be seen as an upper bound, perhaps an 
unrealistically high upper bound. 
One empirical regularity already appears to be emerging from 
the empirical valuation literature. Even if we count only parental 
WTP, the societal benefits of reducing risks to children’s health, in 
 
 84. Nancy Folbre, Children as Public Goods, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 86 (May 1994); 
SYLVIA HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN 
(1991). Economic research on the value of social investments in children has a long history and 
certainly is not the sole domain of feminist economics. See, e.g., Dale Jorgenson & Barbara 
Fraumeni, The Accumulation of Human and Nonhuman Capital, 1948-84, in THE 
MEASUREMENT OF SAVING, INVESTMENT AND WEALTH (Robert Lipsey & Helen Stone eds., 
1989). For a recent discussion of the same issue from a social ethics perspective, see Anne 
Alstott, Property, Taxation and Distributive Justice: What Does a Fair Society Owe Children—
and Their Parents?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941 (2003-04). 
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particular that of young children, appear to be at least double that of 
reducing risks to adults. One concern among economists working on 
this issue has been that these estimates of parental WTP are 
overestimating benefits to children by double counting children’s 
utility. The analysis of law in this article as well as recent work in 
theoretical welfare theory supports EPA’s practical guidance on 
valuing reductions in environmental risks to children’s health. Even if 
parental choices and statements are reflecting nonpaternalistic 
altruism toward children, those children’s preferences are not double 
counted because parents, not children, are speaking for children. And 
parents must reflect both their own benefits and those of the children 
for whom they care. 
Fourth, I would like to return to a theme I raised at the 
beginning of this article. The law of informed consent illustrates just 
one situation in which parents make decisions that affect the health of 
their children. Because parents face competing demands for their 
time, attention, and financial and physical resources, they make 
different choices in the face of changing conditions. Some of these 
choices affect children’s exposure to environmental hazards or the 
consequences of those exposures. Economists are trained to study this 
kind of behavioral choice and can make contributions to exposure 
assessments that have not been fully exploited.  More accurate 
exposure assessment may well lead to better policy decisions and 
greater improvements in children’s health. 
A FINAL WORD 
On October 31, 2005, a new Infanta of Spain, Leonor de Todos 
los Santos de Borbon y Ortiz, was born. The many images of the 
Infanta with clearly doting and delighted parents and grandparents 
show that beliefs about child development have changed significantly 
since Velasquez painted the portrait of her ancestress more than 
three centuries ago.85  In these new portraits, Infanta Leonor is what 
she is—a little princess.  But she is not a little adult.  Hopefully, as we 
begin focusing on the fact that she and other children are children, 
both physically and socially, we will be able to do a better job of 
providing all children with physical environments that allow them to 
develop into healthy adults. 
 
 85. Hola.com, http://www.hola.com/galeria-de-imagenes.html?imagen=/casasreales/2006/01/ 
05/leonor-galeria/imgs/pleo3a.jpg&publi=&nactual=27&nnumeroactual=28&nfotos=46&seccion= 
casasreales&publicacion (last visited March 6, 2007). 
